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Abstract
A recent paper (Edman et al. [6]) has taken a combinatorial approach to measuring
the anonymity of a threshold mix anonymous communications system. Their paper
looks at ways of matching individual messages sent to individual messages received, ir-
respective of user, and determines a measure of the anonymity provided by the system.
Here we extend this approach to include in the calculation information about how many
messages were sent or received by a user and we define a new metric that can be com-
puted exactly and efficiently using classical and elegant techniques from combinatorial
enumeration.
1 Introduction
Anonymity networks have evolved to address the problem of anonymous communication
among users. As internet technology becomes more prevelant in everyday life, questions of
privacy and monitoring become more important. The anonymous network provides a means
of communicating confidentially. However, it is still vulnerable to attack. One of the means
of this is by attempting to match messages sent with messages received. An exhaustive brute
force attack is inefficient; statistical attacks are reasonably fast and reasonably effective.
Further, there is a need for a metric to measure the amount of anonymity that can be
expected from a system.
A mix network, invented by Chaum [2], is a mechanism for anonymizing the correlation
between senders and receivers of messages. Messages are sent into the mix where they
are gathered, permuted and then delivered. There are several mechanisms for doing this,
including a threshold mix which takes in messages and holds them in a buffer until a
predetermined threshold number of messages is reached and then it sends them. The only
possible attacks are based on observation of the input/output behaviour of the mix. We
assume that it is possible for an adversary to see how many messages a user has sent and
how many a user has received.
The main challenge for breaking anonymity in mix networks is determining whether
some user Alice is communicating with some user Bob. A secondary consideration can
be the trajectory of a particular message, either who sent it or who received it. Again
focusing on Alice and Bob, we can either determine a metric which indicates the likelihood
of correlating messages sent by Alice with messages received by Bob, or we can actually
generate an attack which will attempt to break the system and reveal whom Alice is talking
to (or who is talking to Bob).
Metrics allow the user to make an informed choice of anonymity network. They also
allow an evaluation of how good an anonymity model is. Historically, metrics have often
considered either the perspective of an individual user or of an individual message. A recent
paper of Edman et al. expands the view to a system wide approach, but focuses on the
traffic of individual messages. Here we extend the approach to consider the traffic of sets
of messages (in particular, messages sent by the same user, Alice, or received by the same
user, Bob).
Section 2 introduces our metric, reviews existing metrics and explores the differences ours
manifests. Sections 3 and 4 show how to calculate the metric. Section 5 is a presentation
and analysis of the data. Section 6 explores future work and delivers a conclusion.
2 Our Metric
To establish our notation, suppose there are k senders and ℓ receivers, the ith sender sends
si messages in a round and the j
th receiver receives rj messages in a round, and that the
total number of messages sent in a round is n, i.e. s1+ s2+ . . .+ sk = r1+ r2+ . . .+ rℓ = n.
Then we want to know how many ways the n messages could be divided up in this way.
These problems are often modeled, particularly in statistics literature, in terms of balls and
urns. In this language we want to know how many ways there are to deposit n balls in ℓ
urns, where there are k different colours of balls: s1 of one colour, s2 of a second colour,
etc., and each urn is to hold a particular number of balls: the first urn holds r1 balls, the
second urn holds r2 balls, etc.
For example, suppose there are three messages, each labeled by α, sent by A1, three
messages, each labeled by β, sent by A2, and two messages, each labeled by γ, sent by
A3. Suppose B1 receives five messages and B2 receives three messages. Then by direct
exhaustive, brute force enumeration of all the possibilities, there are nine different ways
this could happen, where the first bracketing is the messages received by B1 and the second
bracketing is the messages received by B2: (α,α, α, β, β)(β, γ, γ); (α,α, α, β, γ)(β, β, γ);
(α,α, α, γ, γ)(β, β, β); (α,α, β, β, β)(α, γ, γ); (α,α, β, β, γ)(α, β, γ); (α, β, β, β, γ)(α,α, γ);
(α, β, β, γ, γ)(α,α, β); (β, β, β, γ, γ)(α,α, α) (α,α, βγγ)(αββ).
In this type of system, the attacker can gain information by careful observation of the
volume of messages originating or terminating at a user. Consider at one extreme when n
messages are sent by Alice and n messages are received by Bob and no messages are sent or
received by any other users. Then we know with certainty that the messages sent by Alice
all went to Bob. At the other extreme we have n different senders each sending one message
and n different receivers each receiving one message. In this case the number of possibilities
for sender-receiver pairs is n!. But even at intermediate stages, when some messages are
sent by Alice and some messages are sent by others, and some messages are received by
Bob and some messages are received by others, we can count the number of ways this could
happen. Counting this partitioning is actually a very old problem [11] and can be solved in
terms of a variety of generating functions called symmetric functions, as we will discuss in
Sections 3 and 4.
Our metric expresses the degree of anonymity as a ratio with the denominator repre-
senting the system with the most anonymity. In this metric the most anonymity is provided
by a system in which n messages are sent but each sender sends exactly one message and
each receiver receives exactly one message, as discussed above. In this case there are n!
possibilities to match up a sender message with a receiver message. We can informally
define our metric as
log(COUNT )
log(n!)
, (1)
where COUNT is the number of ways for k senders and ℓ receivers to exchange n
messages if sender i sends si messages and receiver j receives rj messages. We use the
log here to have a compression of the scale for better representation, and to avoid having
numbers that are too large. In Section 3 we will describe in detail how to calculate COUNT .
This metric is simple and straightforward to understand and calculate. It is a system
wide metric that measures the anonymity afforded by the system as a whole, rather than
the anonymity afforded to a single user.
We now review existing metrics. Note that various perspectives are possible, e.g., the
anonymity of an individual user, the anonymity of an individual message, or the anonymity
of the system as a whole. The anonymity metric seeks to distill into a single number the
strength of the network with respect to protecting its users’ anonymity. This number is
referred to as the degree of anonymity and was first proposed by Reiter and Rubin [12].
Their degree of anonymity requires a probability p assigned to each potential sender and is
defined as 1− p for each user. A more systematic approach due to Berthold et al. [1] gives
the degree of anonymity for a system of N users as A = log2(N). These metrics require
estimates of properties of the system and can be imprecise.
The next step in metric evolution is the information theoretic (or entropy based) metrics.
Serjantov and Danezis [13] define a metric S = −
∑n
u=1 pu log2(pu) where n is the number
of users, and pu is the probability that a user u was the sender or the receiver in a message
exchange. This metric is called the effective anonymity set size and it measures the entropy
of the system. Recall that information entropy, as defined by Shannon, reflects the average
information gained over a sequence of symbols, each having some probability. In this case,
we have the probability that a specific user u has sent a message. In the best case, this
value will be equal to log2(n), and grows with n. In the worst case — a user never sends,
or is the only one to send — it will be 0.
An improvement on this approach is the normalized metric of Diaz et al. [5], called the
degree of anonymity, which is defined as
deg =
S
Smax
=
−
∑n
u=1 pu log2(pu)
log2(n)
where the term Smax is the maximum entropy of the system which is log2(n). This division
normalizes the result of Serjantov and Danezis, restricting the range to [0, 1] independent
of n.
There are drawbacks to these formulas. In this last case, it can be argued that, because
of the normalization, it becomes easier to compare results but, at the same time, the number
of users appears to become irrelevant. It also does not consider the users who have sent
messages vs. the set of possible users: these metrics reflect a snapshot of the use of the
system. Such a snapshot is also necessary to evaluate the probabilities required to compute
the formula, but it is difficult to determine the degree of confidence we can have in such
estimates, i.e. their quality.
A different approach is the combinatorial metric of Edman et al. [6]. They first define
a bipartite graph, G = (V1, V2, E), where V1 is the set of sent messages and V2 is the set of
received messages. There is an edge between two messages si and tj if the sent message si
could be the same as the received message tj . Then this graph has an adjacency matrix,
A = (ai,j)n×n, where the rows are indexed by the sent messages V1 and the columns are
indexed by the received messages V2. A perfect matching in a graph is a subset of edges
such that every vertex is adjacent to exactly one edge in the subset. In a bipartite graph
this amounts to a pairing off of each vertex in set V1 with exactly one vertex in set V2.
In a bipartite graph it is well-known how to count the number of perfect matchings in
the graph: they are counted by a mathematical function, the permanent, defined
per(A) =
∑
σ
n∏
i=1
ai,σ(i),
where the sum is over all permutations, σ, of n and A = (ai,j)n×n is the adjacency matrix
of the bipartite graph. The reason the permanent works is as follows: every permutation
selects an entry from each row and each column, so every pair consisting of a vertex in
V1 and a vertex in V2 is represented exactly once. If any of the selected entries is zero
(i.e. there is no edge between those two vertices) then the product is zero and there is no
perfect matching associated with that permutation. Conversely, if all entries are one then
this permutation describes a perfect matching.
Edman et al. define a combinatorial degree of anonymity as follows:
deg =
{
0 n = 1
log(per(A))
log(n!) n > 1
As with the degree of anonymity of Diaz et al. the measure reflects a ratio of the actual
measurement over the ideal case. The denominator is a reflection of the fact that the
system providing the most anonymity is the one in which each sent message is potentially
connected to each received message, i.e. the complete bipartite graph. Then the n × n
adjacency matrix is the all 1’s matrix and the number of perfect matchings is equal to n!,
the number of permutations of n.
Edman et al. then generalize their definition to matrices with entries which are prob-
abilities (doubly stochastic matrices). In this model the probability in position i, j is the
probability that the edge between si and tj is in a perfect matching. Here, as in the un-
weighted case, they take a product of entries. There are a number of concerns with this
approach, some of which our approach corrects.
While the permanent counts perfect matchings in the unweighted case, it is not clear
which statistic is counted in the weighted case, since it is merely the sum of products of
terms in the adjacency matrix. In the case of a 0–1 matrix the permanent terms are the
products of zeros and ones. But the reason there is one term for each perfect matching
is that this procedure is essentially a logical AND. That is, a single zero will make the
product of the entire set zero. So while the entries are technically multiplied, they could
just as easily be ANDed to the same effect. In generalizing to the non 0-1 case it is not
clear why multiplication should be the operation of choice to combine elements, nor what
it counts.
Furthermore, this approach requires the calculation of probabilities for each edge and
this in itself can be problematic. Are these probabilities estimated? (with all the inherent
issues of inaccuracy). Are they calculated, say using an approach such as statistical disclo-
sure? If so, what is the complexity of this approach and what are the quality of results it
provides?
Moreover, the perfect matching approach of Edman et al. considers a sent message, si,
being matched to a received message and counts si being matched to received message tu
as different from si being matched to tv, even if tu and tv are received by the same user.
Certainly they are different messages, but if the goal is to determine who is communicating
with whom, the important part is to determine that one of the many messages Alice sent
is one of the many messages Bob received.
The recent work of Gierlichs et al. [8] refines the metric of Edman et al. to account for
many messages sent and received by each user. To account for this Gierlichs et al. look
at the equivalence class of perfect matchings. This is actually the same situation as what
we have already discussed. For example, if user A1 sends 2 messages and user A2 sends
3 messages, while user B1 receives 2 messages, user B2 receives 2 messages, and user B3
receives one message, and each A user could potentially communicate with each B user,
then there are 5! perfect matchings possible to pair up the messages sent with the messages
received.
The authors denote the perfect matching by MC and each equivalence class by [Mp]
and cardinality |[Mp]| = Cp. The total number of equivalence classes is some value Θ
(determined by the problem). In the example, then, there are 5 equivalence classes with
cardinalities C1 = 12, C2 = 48, C3 = 24, C4 = 12, C5 = 24.
[M1] = [(A1, B1), (A1, B1), (A2, B2), (A2, B2),
(A2, B3)],
[M2] = [(A1, B1), (A1, B2), (A2, B1), (A2, B1),
(A2, B2), (A2, B3)],
[M3] = [(A1, B1), (A1, B3), (A2, B1), (A2, B2),
(A2, B2)],
[M4] = [(A1, B2), (A1, B2), (A2, B1), (A2, B1),
(A2, B3)],
[M5] = [(A1, B2), (A1, B3), (A2, B1), (A2, B1),
(A2, B1), (A2, B2)]
where we have used the notation (Ai, Bj) to mean a pair consisting of an element from Ai
and an element fromBj , so, for example, (A2, B1) is the set of all pairs (a
1
2, b
1
1), (a
1
2, b
2
1), (a
2
2, b
1
1),
(a22, b
2
1), (a
3
2, b
1
1), (a
3
2, b
2
1) where a
i
2 means the ith message sent by user A2.
The authors define the system’s anonymity level, d∗(A), as
−
∑Θ
p=1 Pr(MC ∈ [Mp]) · log(Pr(MC ∈ [Mp]))
log(n!)
if n > 1, and as 0 if n = 1, where Pr(MC ∈ [Mp]) =
Cp
per(A) .
It is worth noting that Franz et al. [7] also take a counting approach, although they
do not do the full generality of sender/receiver patterns. In one instance they look at all
possible combinations of senders for a given set of messages. In another instance they count
senders sending various combinations of messages but do not consider receivers receiving
several messages. While some ideas are similar to ours and could be expanded further
using enumerative techniques, they do not have the full generality of our approach. In fact,
classical enumerative methods used by Franz et al. and Gierlichs et al. indeed work to
count when either the senders or the receivers are fixed at sending or receiving one message
each; to do the full generality of both receivers and senders together dealing in multiple
messages one needs symmetric functions, as discussed below.
Like Gierlichs et al. we suppose that senders and receivers send many messages, we have
a combinatorial metric like Edman et al. and ask “how many ways for these senders to send
to these receivers?”. This differs from Gierlichs et al. who use an entropy based metric,
asking instead, “what’s the probability that this perfect matching is right one?” Their
approach requires the calculation of two parameters: equivalence classes and cardinality
(see Appendix B for a discussion of a way of calculating cardinality). To do this they
provide a divide-and-conquer algorithm that they note becomes rather expensive for large
n. Indeed in their conclusions they suggest that a more efficient algorithm remains an open
problem. Our method essentially calculates the size of the equivalence classes; however,
it does so without explicitly enumerating them, thus the approach is extremely fast and
streamlined. It provides a rapid but accurate measure of the anonymity of the system. As
we discuss in Section 5, numerous trends can be discerned and this provides an interesting
focus for future work.
3 Calculating our Metric
We now turn our attention to determining COUNT as defined in Section 2. The calculation
of it is straightforward; however, it requires some “heavy machinery” from combinatorial
enumeration, namely generating functions and symmetric functions (which are a special
type of generating function). We briefly review generating functions before discussing the
appropriate one for this particular problem. Excellent introductions to generating functions
can be found in [9], [14] or [17].
A generating function is a sum of powers of x where the coefficient of xi counts how
many items of size i there are. In a sense the powers of x are merely placeholders, with the
ith power holding the place for items of size i, and the x’s are not expected to be evaluated.
For example, if there are four ways of having two messages delivered, three ways of having
one message delivered, and one way of having no messages delivered, then the generating
function is 1+3x+4x2. For a counting problem a generating function is set up that models
the problem and then the required coefficient is extracted. The notation [xi] means “the
coefficient of xi.” Thus in the example, [x2](1 + 3x+ 4x2) will give us the value 4.
Generating functions have the advantage that they encode all the enumerative infor-
mation and they can easily be manipulated, e.g. multiplied together. The extraction of a
coefficient can prove to be a challenge sometimes if a direct formula for it is not easily ob-
tainable. In this case a symbolic computation program such as Maple can be an important
tool.
Turning to our specific problem, the generating function allows us, given the number of
messages sent and received by various users, to determine exactly the number of ways this
could take place. If there are a lot of ways for this to take place then the system does not
leak much information and remains relatively anonymous. If there are only a few ways for
this to take place then the system is leaking a lot of information.
We define our degree of anonymity precisely as follows. As mentioned above, we take a
ratio with the denominator representing the system with the most anonymity, i.e a system
in which each user sends or receives a single message. In this system our approach is no
better than counting perfect matchings and there are n! possibilities. The numerator is the
number of ways the n messages could be divided up. This is the coefficient of xs11 x
s2
2 . . . x
sk
k
in the generating function, GF , for the number of ways of n messages being received such
that the ith user receives ri messages, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. Thus the degree is
degA =
log([xs11 x
s2
2 . . . x
sk
k ]GF )
log(n!)
. (2)
Now we consider the form of the generating function, GF , for this problem. This
generating function is a special type of function called a symmetric function. First, a number
of further definitions are required. A symmetric function f(x) in variables x1, x2, . . . xk is a
function such that a permutation of the variables does not change the value of the function,
i.e. f(xσ(1), xσ(2), . . . , xσ(k)) = f(x1, x2, . . . , xk). Then the homogeneous symmetric function
of degree m, hm(x), is the sum of all homogeneous terms in x = x1, x2, . . . , xk, i.e.
h1(x1, x2, x3) = x1 + x2 + x3
h2(x1, x2, x3) = x
2
1 + x
2
2 + x
2
3 + x1x2
+ x1x3 + x2x3
h3(x1, x2, x3) = x
3
1 + x
3
2 + x
3
3 + x
2
1x2 + x
2
1x3
+ x1x
2
2 + x
2
2x3 + x1x
2
3 + x2x
2
3
+ x1x2x3
The homogeneous symmetric functions can also be defined for infinite sets of variables.
Furthermore, for λ = λ1, λ2, . . . , λm a partition of n, where λ1 + λ2 + . . . + λm = n (i.e. a
nondecreasing sequence of nonnegative integers that sum to n), then hλ is defined as the
product hλ1hλ2 . . . hλm .
Theorem 1 Given that si messages are sent by each sender, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and that ri
messages are received by each receiver, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, in a round, the number of ways this could
happen is
[xs11 x
s2
2 . . . x
sk
k ]hr1(x)hr2(x) . . . hrℓ(x)
where x is x1, x2, . . . , xk and hq(x) is the homogeneous symmetric function of degree q.
Proof: The term hm(x1, x2 . . . , xk) counts the number of different waysm elements could
be received where the elements are drawn from 1, 2, . . . , k (e.g. if there were three elements
received and two possible kinds of elements, then this is h3(x1, x2) = x
3
1+x
3
2+x
2
1x2+x1x
2
2).
The product hr1(x)hr2(x) . . . hrℓ(x) is, by the product lemma in enumerative combina-
torics [9][pp36-37], the generating function for the number of ways of one user receiving r1
elements, a second user receiving r2 elements, etc, simultaneously.
The term [xsii ] denotes the coefficient of x
si
i in the expression. This counts the number
of ways si i’s could be sent.
The entire expression in the statement of the theorem thus counts in general the number
of ways si i’s could be sent and ri i’s could be received.
QED
Thus the generating function we require is a symmetric function and we can define our
degree of anonymity to be
degA =
log([xs11 x
s2
2 . . . x
sk
k ]hr1(x)hr2(x) . . . hrℓ(x))
log(n!)
. (3)
where there are k senders and ℓ receivers, the ith sender sends si messages in a round and
the jth receiver receives rj messages in a round, and that the total number of messages sent
in a round is n, i.e. s1 + s2 + . . .+ sk = r1 + r2 + . . .+ rℓ = n.
Consider an example. Recall that earlier we showed the example of an input/output
round of three messages sent by A1, three messages sent by A2, two messages sent by A3,
five messages received by B1, and three messages received by B2. In our generating function
terms this means that we need two complete generating functions: h5 for B1 and h3 for
B2 (since B1 receives five messages and B2 receives three messages). Since there are three
users sending messages, the number of variables for each generating function is limited to
three. Since we know that A1 sends three messages, A2 sends three messages, and A3 sends
two messages, we require the coefficient of x31x
3
2x
2
3. Specifically,
h5(x1, x2, x3) = x
5
1 + x
5
2 + x
5
3 + x
4
1x2 + x
4
1x3
+x42x1 + x
4
2x3 + x
4
3x1 + x
4
3x2
+x31x
2
2 + x
3
1x
2
3 + x
3
2x
2
1 + x
3
2x
2
3
+x33x
2
1 + x
3
3x
2
2 + x
3
1x2x3
+x32x1x3 + x
3
3x2x1 + x
2
1x
2
2x3
+x21x
2
3x2 + x
2
2x
2
3x1
and
h3(x1, x2, x3) = x
3
1 + x
3
2 + x
3
3 + x
2
1x2 + x
2
1x3
+x22x1 + x
2
2x3 + x
2
3x1 + x
2
3x2
+x1x2x3
We can multiply these two generating functions together and collect terms (admit-
tedly a slow process, but we will improve on it in Section 4). This approach shows
that h5(x1, x2, x3)h3(x1, x2, x3) has nine terms of the form x
3
1x
3
2x
2
3 formed from the follow-
ing products: (x31x
2
2)(x2x
2
3); (x
3
1x2x3)(x
2
2x3); (x
3
1x
2
3)(x
3
2); (x
3
2x
2
1)(x1x
2
3); (x
2
1x
2
2x3)(x1x2x3);
(x32x1x3)(x
2
1x3); (x1x
2
2x
2
3)(x
2
1x2); (x
3
2x
2
3)(x
3
1) (x
2
1x2x
2
3)(x1x
2
2); .
Thus [x31x
3
2x
2
3]h5(x1, x2, x3)h3(x1, x2, x3) = 9. Note that these can be matched exactly with
the α, β, γ terms obtained earlier in the section through direct enumeration of the various
possibilities.
Also compare this approach with the permanent-based approach that considers all pos-
sible combinations of messages sent and received. Since there are eight messages involved,
there are 8! = 40320 ways to send them, a substantially larger number of possibilities.
Our degree of anonymity is log 9/ log 40320 = 0.954/4.605 = 0.207 whereas the degree of
anonymity of Edman et al. is 1.
4 Extracting the Coefficient
Recall from Section 3 that the generating function for the problem is the homogeneous
symmetric function hλ and that in order to evaluate our degree of anonymity, degA, in
equation (3) we need to extract the coefficient. This section explores the theoretical basis
for this extraction and explains the calculation that needs to be made.
Symmetric functions form a graded ring. The most natural basis for this ring is the set
of monomial symmetric functions. The monomial symmetric functions, mλ, are defined as
mλ(x) =
∑
α x
α where the sum ranges over all distinct permutations α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn)
of the entries of the partition λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn). For example, m3,1,1(x1, x2, x3, x4) =
x31x2x3 + x
3
1x2x4 + x
3
1x3x4 + x
3
2x1x3 + x
3
2x1x4 + x
3
2x3x4 + x
3
3x1x2 + x
3
3x1x4 + x
3
3x2x4 +
x34x1x2+x
3
4x1x3+x
3
4x2x3. As a basis, then, we can write any symmetric function, f(x), as∑
λ fλmλ(x) where the sum is over all partitions of n.
There is also a very natural scalar product defined on this ring. It is defined such that
< mλ(x), hµ(x) >= δλ,µ where δλ,µ equals 1 if λ = µ and 0 otherwise. Note in particular
that, although the monomial symmetric functions, and indeed the homogeneous symmetric
functions, are both bases for the ring of symmetric functions, neither is an orthonormal basis
with this scalar product. This scalar product however allows us to extract the coefficients
of a symmetric function f(x). Suppose we want [xµ11 x
µ2
2 , . . . x
µk
k ]. Then
< f(x), hµ(x) > = <
∑
λ
fλmλ(x), hµ(x) > (4)
=
∑
λ
fλ < mλ(x), hµ(x) > (5)
= fµ. (6)
Thus to compute the number of ways k senders could send s1, s2, . . . , sk messages and ℓ
receivers could receive r1, r2, . . . , rℓ messages, we calculate the scalar product < hs1 ∗ hs2 ∗
. . . ∗ hsk , hr1 ∗ hr2 ∗ . . . ∗ hrℓ >.
The step-by-step justification for the procedure to calculate the number of ways k senders
and ℓ receivers send n messages in a round such that the ith sender sends si messages and
the jth receiver receives rj messages, is as follows:
1. By Theorem 1 this number can be represented by [xs11 x
s2
2 . . . x
sk
k ]hr1(x)hr2(x) . . . hrℓ(x).
2. By equation (6) the coefficient for xs11 x
s2
2 . . . x
sk
k is equal to the scalar product of
the generating function representing senders and the generating function representing
receivers.
3. By the proof of Theorem 1 and the comments before Theorem 1, the complete sym-
metric function, hs, is the generating function for a sender sending s messages, and
hs1hs2 . . . hsk is the generating function for k senders with the i
th sender sending si
messages. Similarly for receivers.
Now that we can extract the coefficient via the scalar product, we can calculate our
degree of anonymity, degA. However, with the exception of a few special cases, obtaining a
closed form expression for the scalar product is difficult. The alternative is to use a symbolic
computation package, such as Maple, to calculate the scalar product. In the next section
we outline the results we obtained using such a program. The computations presented here
were carried out using Maple 8 and the symmetric functions package, SF, written by John
Stembridge [15]. All of the calculations mentioned ran in a few seconds or less.
5 Data Analysis
We have already discussed the extremes of the metric (i.e. when Alice sends all messages, or
when each user sends exactly one) and have discussed how it discerns between cases better
than the metric of Edman et al. In this section we conduct a number of experiments on the
metric and discover a number of patterns and trends. In particular we explore what the
metric looks like, some interesting features of it, and answers to some interesting questions.
The two figures, Figure 1 and Figure 2, illustrate the behaviour of the metric from
more favourable (anonymous) to less favourable situations, based on two different scenarios
where Alice’s communications become predominant. The first considers the case where the
number of messages sent by Alice increases but the number of messages stays the same.
The second considers the case where the number of messages sent by Alice increases and the
total number of messages also increases. These both show that the metric tends to linear
as the values increase away from perfect anonymity.
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Figure 1: For a total 15 messages sent to distinct receivers, evolution as Alice sends growing
numbers of these messages.
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Figure 2: For seven distinct senders, including Alice, and one receiver per message, evolution
as Alice sends from one to 13 messages and all others send one.
Now we turn to features. This metric has many interesting features, as illustrated by
the following example for n = 7. We have calculated the coefficients for all sender-receiver
combinations for n = 7 messages and the results are shown in a table in the Appendix.
Note that in the table we have taken advantage of symmetry, i.e. s1, s2 . . . , sk senders and
r1, r2, . . . , rℓ receivers gives the same coefficient as r1, r2, . . . , rk senders and s1, s2, . . . , sk
receivers. We have worked with n = 7 because the number of cases to consider is tractable
and the coefficients obtained are small enough to be meaningful; however, the calculations
also run in seconds on larger values of n. The table shows clearly that, as one would expect,
a lot of senders sending a few messages each (or a lot of receivers, receiving few messages
each) results in the most anonymity. A closer examination of the table reveals a number of
interesting facts.
First, coalescing a sender of a single message into another sender (e.g. going from
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 to 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2) cuts the coefficient by a factor proportional to the new
sender’s number of messages, a dramatic reduction in the anonymity. More precisely, going
from 1, k to k + 1 divides the coefficient by k + 1. The same applies to receivers. The
coefficient is cut by a smaller amount because the log smooths the function.
Second, there are counterintuitive instances as well where more senders (resp. receivers)
and fewer messages is not superior. For example, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1; 1, 2, 2, 2 has a coefficient
of 630 and degree 0.756 and 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2; 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 has a coefficient of 690 and coefficient
0.767, yet the first sender-receiver pair has more senders. Of course the second has more
receivers. A further interesting case is 1, 3, 3; 2, 2, 3 with coefficient 19 and degree 0.345, and
1, 3, 3; 1, 1, 1, 4 with coefficient 20 and degree 0.351, and thus a barely discernable difference
between the coefficients and degree, yet the second group has more receivers. It can be
difficult to strike a hard and fast rule about which is better.
Third, it is actually relatively easy to rank the partitions from most anonymous to least.
Messages Coeff Deg
1,1,1,1,1,1,1 5040 1
1,1,1,1,1,2 2520 0.919
1,1,1,2,2 1260 0.832
1,1,1,1,3 840 0.790
1,2,2,2 630 0.756
1,1,2,3 420 0.708
1,1,1,4 210 0.627
2,2,3 210 0.627
1,3,3 140 0.580
1,2,4 105 0.546
1,1,5 42 0.438
3,4 35 0.417
2,5 21 0.357
1,6 7 0.228
7 1 0
In comparing the 15 possible sender partitions with a receiver set 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, we
can order, from most anonymous, to least anonymous as shown in the table above. This
trend holds up with other receiver sets as well, showing that, in general, more senders is
better, although, as noted in the second point, when the receiver set also varies, there is
some variation from this rule.
Finally, we can also represent the n = 7 information graphically in Figure 3. This plots
the different coefficients we may have and shows that, except near the extreme values, the
changes in the degree tend to be linear in terms of the variations in the coefficients.
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Figure 3: Ordered Values of the Metric Generated from All Permutations of Seven
Another interesting feature for any n occurs when the number of messages sent by one
party is equal to or greater than the total messages sent by all other parties. In this case the
coefficient stops increasing, although, of course, the degree decreases. For example (note
we used the notation 16 to mean 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1),
Messages Coeff Deg
1, 16; 1, 16 5040 1
2, 16; 2, 16 10,440 0.873
3, 16; 3, 16 12,840 0.739
4, 16; 4, 16 13,290 0.629
5, 16; 5, 16 13,326 0.543
6, 16; 6, 16 13,327 0.475
7, 16; 7, 16 13,327 0.421
8, 16; 8, 16 13,327 0.377
9, 16; 9, 16 13,327 0.340
10, 16; 10, 16 13,327 0.310
In terms of answering an interesting question, we can derive some information on the
importance of the size of the mix on the metric. As any degree metric is a ratio, it does
not explicitly take into account the number of users in the system. It is then a legitimate
question to see how, for a given sender/receiver pattern, the value evolves as the size of the
mix increases. Figure 4 presents such an experiment, where the ratio of messages sent from
Alice to Bob remains the same as the number of users increases. More precisely, the figure
shows the effect on degree of anonymity as the number of messages increases in the case
when the ratio of Alice’s messages sent (and Bob’s messages received) to the total number of
messages sent stays the same. In each instance k messages are sent: Alice sends p messages,
and the k − p other users each send one message, while Bob receives p messages and the
other k − p users each receive one message (for p = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and k = 9p+ 1).
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have developed an elegant and easy way to calculate a metric for the degree of anonymity
of an anonymous communication system. Our metric uses techniques from classical enumer-
ation to count without actually calculating the various possibilities of senders and receivers
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Figure 4: Scalability of the metric
exchanging different combinations of messages. It nicely and naturally extends the metric
of Edman et al. [6] who introduced the combinatorial approach to this area. Our metric
is straightforward to calculate employing Maple and using it we are able to produce data
that highlight a number of significant trends such as we produced in Section 5.
Future work will focus on practical uses of the metric. One possible direction is to turn
our metric into an attack. At the moment it is a measure of the degree of anonymity a user
could expect, but it may be possible to further exploit the knowledge of the partition sizes
to break the anonymity network.
The “mostly linear” behaviour we have mentioned in Section 5 deserves further study.
While we feel linearity is an interesting property for a metric to have, Figure 3 shows that
it does not appear in the extreme cases of full or zero anonymity. Further investigation is
required to explore the limits of this approximation with large sizes, and how it can be best
exploited practically.
A further useful practical outcome would be a recommendation to Alice on what she
should do at each stage. For example, would sending another message to Bob increase the
likelihood of detection or not? Is she advised to send a message to someone else? Should she
wait until the next round? It may be possible to provide guidance to her using knowledge
of the partition sizes.
Finally, future work could include more analysis of the data: this metric is a fast, simple
tool for calculating the anonymity of the system; as we showed in Section 5 it allows a
number of interesting features to be detected. More analysis will yield more patterns.
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A Example
This is the table of all possible sender-receiver pairs for n = 7 messages. The table includes
the symmetric function coefficient as well as the degree of anonymity. Note that the notation
17 means 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1.
Messages Coeff Deg
17;17 5040 1
17; 15,2 2520 0.919
17; 13,2,2 1260 0.832
17; 1,1,1,1,3 840 0.790
17; 1,2,2,2 630 0.756
17; 1,1,2,3 420 0.708
17; 1,1,1,4 210 0.627
17; 2,2,3 210 0.627
17; 1,3,3 140 0.580
17; 1,2,4 105 0.546
17; 1,1,5 42 0.438
17; 3,4 35 0.417
17; 2,5 21 0.357
17; 1,6 7 0.228
17; 7 1 0
15,2; 15, 2 1320 0.843
15,2; 1,1,1,2,2 690 0.767
15,2; 1,1,1,1,3 480 0.724
15,2; 1,2,2,2 360 0.690
15,2; 1,1,2,3 250 0.648
15,2; 1,1,1,4 135 0.575
15,2; 2,2,3 130 0.571
15,2; 1,3,3 90 0.528
15,2; 1,2,4 70 0.498
15,2; 1,1,5 31 0.403
15,2; 3,4 25 0.378
15,2; 2,5 16 0.325
15,2; 1,6 6 0.210
15,2; 7 1 0
1,1,1,2,2; 1,1,1,2,2 378 0.696
1,1,1,2,2; 1,1,1,3 270 0.657
1,1,1,2,2; 1,2,2,2 207 0.626
1,1,1,2,2; 1,1,2,3 148 0.586
1,1,1,2,2; 1,1,1,4 84 0.520
1,1,1,2,2; 2,2,3 81 0.515
1,1,1,2,2; 1,3,3 58 0.476
1,1,1,2,2; 1,2,4 46 0.449
1,1,1,2,2; 1,1,5 22 0.363
1,1,1,2,2; 3,4 18 0.339
1,1,1,2,2; 2,5 12 0.291
Messages Coeff Deg
1,1,1,2,2; 1,6 5 0.189
1,1,1,2,2; 7 1 0
1,1,1,1,3; 1,1,1,1,3 208 0.626
1,1,1,1,3; 1,2,2,2 150 0.588
1,1,1,1,3; 1,1,2,3 114 0.556
1,1,1,1,3; 1,1,1,4 73 0.503
1,1,1,1,3; 2,2,3 62 0.484
1,1,1,1,3; 1,3,3 46 0.449
1,1,1,1,3; 1,2,4 39 0.430
1,1,1,1,3; 1,1,5 21 0.357
1,1,1,1,3; 3,4 15 0.318
1,1,1,1,3; 2,5 11 0.281
1,1,1,1,3; 1,6 5 0.189
1,1,1,1,3; 7 1 0
1,2,2,2; 1,2,2,2 120 0.562
1,2,2,2; 1,1,2,3 87 0.524
1,2,2,2; 1,1,1,4 51 0.461
1,2,2,2; 2,2,3 51 0.461
1,2,2,2; 1,3,3 37 0.424
1,2,2,2; 1,2,4 30 0.399
1,2,2,2; 1,1,5 15 0.318
1,2,2,2; 3,4 13 0.301
1,2,2,2; 2,5 9 0.258
1,2,2,2; 1,6 4 0.163
1,2,2,2; 7 1 0
1,1,2,3; 1,1,2,3 67 0.493
1,1,2,3; 1,1,1,4 43 0.441
1,1,2,3; 2,2,3 39 0.430
1,1,2,3; 1,3,3 30 0.399
1,1,2,3; 1,2,4 25 0.378
1,1,2,3; 1,1,5 14 0.310
1,1,2,3; 3,4 11 0.281
1,1,2,3; 2,5 8 0.244
1,1,2,3; 1,6 4 0.163
1,1,2,3; 7 1 0
1,1,1,4; 1,1,1,4 34 0.414
1,1,1,4; 2,2,3 25 0.378
1,1,1,4; 1,3,3 20 0.351
1,1,1,4; 1,2,4 19 0.345
1,1,1,4; 1,1,5 13 0.301
1,1,1,4; 3,4 8 0.244
1,1,1,4; 2,5 7 0.228
1,1,1,4; 1,6 4 0.163
1,1,1,4; 7 1 0
Messages Coeff Deg
2,2,3; 2,2,3 25 0.378
2,2,3; 1,3,3 19 0.345
2,2,3; 1,2,4 16 0.325
2,2,3; 1,1,5 9 0.258
2,2,3; 3,4 3 0.129
2,2,3; 2,5 6 0.210
2,2,3; 1,6 3 0.129
2,2,3; 7 1 0
1,3,3; 1,3,3 15 0.318
1,3,3; 1,2,4 13 0.301
1,3,3; 1,1,5 8 0.244
1,3,3; 3,4 7 0.228
1,3,3; 2,5 5 0.189
1,3,3; 1,6 3 0.129
1,3,3; 7 1 0
1,2,4; 1,2,4 12 0.291
1,2,4; 1,1,5 8 0.244
1,2,4; 3,4 6 0.210
1,2,4; 2,5 5 0.189
1,2,4; 1,6 3 0.129
1,2,4; 7 1 0
1,1,5; 1,1,5 7 0.228
1,1,5; 3,4 4 0.163
1,1,5; 2,5 4 0.163
1,1,5; 1,6 3 0.129
1,1,5; 7 1 0
3,4; 3,4 4 0.163
3,4; 2,5 3 0.129
3,4; 1,6 2 0.081
3,4; 7 1 0
2,5; 2,5 3 0.129
2,5; 1,6 2 0.081
2,5; 7 1 0
1,6; 1,6 2 0.081
1,6; 7 1 0
7; 7 1 0
B Cardinality of equivalence classes
We can outline a procedure for calculating the cardinality of the equivalence classes as
required for the metric of Gierlichs et al.
We know the size of both the sender sets and the receiver sets. Suppose there are p
sender sets and q receiver sets. Each receiver set will consist of elements from the sender
sets in some combination.
1. First determine all integer partitions of each of the receiver sets. This can be done, for
example, with the algorithm from [18]. The integer partitions will count the number of
possible ways the sender sets can be partitioned in the receiver set. For example, if the
receiver set has 3 elements then the partitions are: 1, 1, 1; 2, 1; 3. We could have one
element from each sender set, two elements from one of the sender sets and another
element from another sender set, or all elements from a single sender set. However,
the problem here is that determining this properly is probably equivalent to explicitly
determining the equivalence classes to begin with and this laborious procedure is
something we avoid through the power of our symmetric function method. We want
to find all sequences t1i, t2i, . . . , tki such that
∑
a tai = ri. But we want for the same
set of t’s to find all sequences tj1, tj2, . . . , tjℓ such that
∑
b tjb = sj. This could be
done either by exhaustive search or through an integer programming approach.
2. Since we have determined how many ways each sender set could be partitioned so that
tji elements go to receiver set i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we can construct a series of multinomial
coefficients of the form
sj !
tj1!tj2!...tjℓ!
.
3. Now the elements within each receiver set of size ri can be arranged in ri! ways.
The cardinality of receiver set i is
∏
j
sj !
tj1!tj2!...tjℓ!
ri!.
The cardinality of the equivalence class is
∏
i
∏
j
sj !
tj1!tj2!...tjℓ!
ri! .
